An Economic Analysis of Difficulties in Implementing China's Small Claims Litigation System: Based on Participants' Game Strategy

摘要

After the amendment of the China Civil Procedure Law, 2012, the small claims litigation system was originally established and introduced as a system to simplify litigation procedures, improve litigation efficiency, and facilitate people's access to justice. However, in the process of implementation, the system encountered a more obvious "difficult to implement" phenomenon, did not fully play the intended purpose of the system design. Through the discussion and analysis of the theories and methods of law and economics, especially the viewpoints and methods of game theory, it is found that there is a clear conflict between the design objectives of the system of small claims and the interests orientation of the practitioners, which constitutes a strong friction resistance to the implementation of the system. Therefore, in an ideal state, a large number of cases which are applicable to small claims litigation have been "leaked out" through legitimate channels, which to a great extent leads to the "emptiness" of the system. Therefore, we must fully face up to and respect the interest orientation and concern of the subject of the implementation of the system, abandon the unrealistic view of "compulsory application", and take effective dredging of the resistance points of the implementation of the system, strengthening the source of motive force for the implementation of the small claims litigation system, and smoothing the transmission mechanism of motive force as the principle, so as to fully improve the implicit civil litigation system. Only in this way can the mechanism of "price" reach an ideal equilibrium state of behavior and realize its original purpose.