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Study on Long-term Mechanism for Government to Encourage Enterprises on Low-carbon Development —Analysis based on Enterprises' Capacity Variance and Task Difficulty

机译:政府长期机制的研究,鼓励企业低碳发展 - 基于企业产能方差和任务难度的分析

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摘要

Based on reference to Lazear and Rosen (1981) rank-order tournaments mechanism model, this essay introduces the two variables, namely capacity variance and task difficulty, to establish a long-term mechanism model for the government to encourage enterprises for low-carbon development. It is included through model analysis that, the optimal effort level during enterprises' low-carbon development is directly proportional to bonus difference (L-l) set by the government, and inversely proportional to task difficulty, capacity variance and "performance" appraisal error. When enterprises' capacities are identical, their optimal effort level will be the highest and equal. Besides, the government should take task difficulty and capacity into comprehensive consideration to set reasonable bonus difference. If task difficulty is relatively large, the government should enlarge bonus difference; if task difficulty is small, the government should correspondingly shorten bonus difference.
机译:基于Lazear和Rosen(1981)秩序锦标赛机制模型的参考,本文介绍了两个变量,即容量方差和任务难度,为政府建立了一个长期机制模型,鼓励企业进行低碳发展企业。通过模型分析,企业低碳发展期间的最佳努力水平与政府设定的奖金差异(L-L)成正比,与任务难度,容量方差和“绩效”评估错误成反比。当企业的能力相同时,它们的最佳努力水平将是最高和相等的。此外,政府应采取任务困难和全面考虑的能力,以确定合理的奖励差异。如果任务难度相对较大,政府应该扩大奖金差异;如果任务难度小,政府应该相应地缩短奖金差异。

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