VOLUNTARY APPROACHES TO TRANSITIONING FROM COMPETIVE FISHERIES TO RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

摘要

Despite potential advantages of rights-based management over competitive fisheries, there has been significant political resistance to rights-based management from many fishermen, which has slowed the adoption of rights-based management. This paper explores the concept of voluntary transitions to rights-based management, under which fishermen may choose between an allocated fishery (with individual or group quotas) or a competitive fishery, and the relative distribution of the total quota between theallocated and competitive fishery depends upon how many fishermen choose to participate in each. Voluntary transitions are possible if (a) access has already been limited; and (b) it is possible to divide the fishery—for example temporally or spatially—into two fisheries managed under different rules. By allocating disproportionately more fish to the competitive fishery, voluntary transitions may become a "win-win" approach under which both groups become better off, while over time an increasing proportion of fishermen choose to join the allocated fishery. This paper uses an experimental approach, in which subjects simulate actual fishing, to test and demonstrate the potential of voluntary transitions from competitive to rights-based fishing. The paper also discusses the Alaska Chignik salmon cooperative, an example of a voluntary transition from competitive to rights-based fishing.