We consider a political candidate campaigning to be elected. Her chances of being elected will depend on how various groups of voters perceive her, and how they perceive her will depend on what she has said. Different groups of voters may have different preferences and a statement preferred by one group of voters may be disliked by another. Moreover, voters may be optimistic (willing to think the best of the candidate), pessimistic (inclined to expect the worse), or expected value voters, who average over various possibilities which may come about if she is elected. Given these considerations, what should she say? We formalize this problem in propositional logic with certain utility values, and certain intensities of preference for various groups of voters, and show that if the voters are expected value voters, then she is best off being as explicit as possible. Thus a reluctance to be explicit may come about as a result of the presence of optimistic voters.
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机译：我们考虑一项政治候选人竞选活动。 Her chances of being elected will depend on how various groups of voters perceive her, and how they perceive her will depend on what she has said.不同的选民群体可能具有不同的偏好，并且可以对另一组选民进行优先的陈述可能被另一个选民矛盾。此外，选民可能是乐观的（愿意认为候选人的最佳），悲观（倾向于期望更糟糕的），或预期的价值选民，他们平均过各种可能会出现的可能性。鉴于这些考虑，她应该怎么说？我们在具有某些实用价值观的命题逻辑中将这个问题正式化，以及各种选民组的某些偏好的强度，并表明如果选民是预期的价值选民，那么她最好尽可能明确。因此，由于存在乐观的选民，这可能是明确的明确可能会出现。
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