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Agents' Bidding Strategies in a Combinatorial Auction Controlled Grid Environment

机译:组合拍卖控制网格环境中的代理商的竞标策略

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In this article we present an agent-based simulation environment for task scheduling in a grid-like computer system. The scheduler allows to one simultaneously allocate resources such as CPU time, communication bandwidth, volatile and non-volatile memory by employing a combinatorial resource allocation mechanism. The allocation is performed by an iterative combinatorial auction in which proxy-bidding agents try to acquire their desired resource allocation profiles with respect to limited monetary budget endowments. To achieve an efficient allocation process, the auctioneer provides resource price information to the bidders. We use a pricing mechanism based on shadow prices in a closed loop system in which the agents use monetary units awarded for the resources they provide to the system for the acquisition of complementary capacity. Our objective is to identify optimal bidding strategies in the multi-agent setting with respect to varying preferences in terms of resource quantity and waiting time for the resources. Based on a utility function we characterize two types of agents: a quantity maximizing agent with a low preference for fast bid acceptance and an impatient bidding agent with a high valuation of fast access to the resources. By evaluating different strategies with varying initial bid pricing and price increments, it turns out that for quantity maximizing agents patience and low initial bids pay off, whereas impatient agents should avoid high initial bid prices.
机译:在本文中,我们介绍了一种基于代理的仿真环境,用于网格状计算机系统中的任务调度。调度器允许通过采用组合资源分配机制同时同时分配诸如CPU时间,通信带宽,易失性和非易失性存储器的资源。通过迭代组合拍卖来执行分配,其中代理竞标代理试图在有限的货币预算禀赋方面尝试获取所需的资源分配简档。为实现有效的分配过程,拍卖师向投标人提供资源价格信息。我们使用基于闭环系统的阴影价格的定价机制,其中代理商使用货币单位为他们提供的资源授予,以获取补充能力。我们的目标是在资源数量和资源等候时间方面确定多智能偏好的多代理环境中的最佳竞标策略。基于实用功能,我们表征了两种类型的代理:一个数量最大化代理,具有低偏好,用于快速投标验收和不耐烦的招标代理,具有高估值的快速访问资源。通过评估不同初始出价定价和价格增量的不同策略,事实证明,对于最大化代理人的数量,耐心和低初始出价偿还,而耐急因素应避免高初始竞标价格。

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