An empirical analysis of influence on agency costs from corporate financial structure

摘要

Based on the measurement of agency costs between shareholders and managers, the paper takes the state-owned listed companies and private listed companies in china from 2003-2006 as research objects and investigates the influence on agency costs from corporate financial structure. The results indicate that the overall debt level is positively correlated with agency costs, but in state-owned listed companies the extents are greater than those in private listed companies; the influence of bank loans on agency costs is better than that of commercial credits, both of which in private listed companies are better than those in state-owned listed companies; the influence of short-term debt on agency costs is better than that of long-term debt, both of which in private listed companies are better than those in state-owned listed companies; the managerial shareholding ratio is positively correlated with agency costs but the coefficient is insignificant in both private listed companies and state-owned listed companies; the controlling stockholder ratio is negatively correlated with agency costs in private listed companies while the coefficient is positive and insignificant in state-owned companies; the outside large stockholder ratio is negatively correlated with agency costs, and their influences on agency costs in state-owned listed companies are more distinct than those in private listed companies.