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Why We Don't Learn What We Should From HAZOPs

机译:为什么我们不学习我们应该来自Hazops的东西

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It is difficult to learn effectively from projects for many reasons. Despite these difficulties we have learned a great deal in the area of process safety over the past few years as a result of more intense focus on safety both in design and in operation. An example of the increased focus on safety is the increased use of HAZOPs. Almost all process designs are now subjected to one or more HAZOP studies over the course of the project. A HAZOP is a structured method for identifying process design flaws. No such method could ever be perfect. Some design errors will be missed; some problems identified may not be effectively corrected; and some problem "corrections" create new, sometimes worse problems. This paper applies a structured method to identify cognitive, social and organizational factors which limit the effectiveness of HAZOPs. It is important to consider behavior at these three levels to get a complete picture. At the cognitive level we are interested in why individuals make mistakes and why they resist efforts of others to correct those mistakes (defensiveness). At the social level we need to consider how social interactions, especially those within a design team, impact design effectiveness and defensiveness. Impacts at the organizational level are more subtle and less well understood. The overall organization of a large project will include the operating company, partners, design contractors, construction and installation contractors, vendors, government agencies and others. The processes, procedures, standards and cultures of each of these groups and the interfaces between these groups will impact design decisions and the ability of the design teams to implement changes. Studying the HAZOP process via a structured method yields new insights into the causes of limited learning in HAZOPs. These insights provide ideas for improving the HAZOP process. HAZOPs are the last and best line of defense we have for catching design errors and omissions. A significant improvement in the process could provide a step change in the safety performance of process designs.
机译:由于许多原因,很难从项目中有效地学习。尽管有这些困难,但在过去几年中,我们在过去几年中学到了过程安全领域的大量巨大,因此在设计和操作中都有更强烈的焦点。对安全的增加的一个例子是增加了HAZOPS的使用。几乎所有流程设计现在都会在项目过程中遭受一个或多个HAZOP研究。 HAZOP是一种用于识别过程设计缺陷的结构化方法。没有这样的方法可能是完美的。一些设计错误将被遗漏;确定的一些问题可能无法有效纠正;有些问题“更正”创造了新的,有时候越来越糟糕的问题。本文适用一个结构化方法来识别限制HAZOPS有效性的认知,社会和组织因素。重要的是要考虑这三个级别的行为,以获得完整的画面。在认知水平,我们对为什么个人犯错误,为什么他们抵制他人纠正这些错误(防御)的努力。在社会层面,我们需要考虑社交互动如何,尤其是设计团队中的人,影响设计效果和防御。在组织层面的影响更为微妙,更不太了解。大型项目的整体组织将包括运营公司,合作伙伴,设计承包商,建筑和安装承包商,供应商,政府机构等。这些群体的过程,程序,标准和文化和这些组之间的界面将影响设计决策和设计团队实施变化的能力。通过结构化方法研究HAZOP过程会产生新的见解,陷入HAZOPS中有限的学习原因。这些见解提供了改善HAZOP过程的想法。 Hazops是我们用于捕获设计错误和遗漏的最后一个和最佳的防线。该过程的显着改进可以提供过程设计的安全性能的步骤变化。

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