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An amendment to final-offer arbitration

机译:最终提供仲裁的修正案

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摘要

Final-offer arbitration (FOA) was proposed to settle a dispute between two disputants. Although FOA was proposed to induce two disputants to reach an agreements by themselves, FOA fails to achieve the fulfilment, when disputants have incomplete information about the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement. This paper proposes a new arbitration procedure, which is a simple amendment to FOA that lets the arbitration settlement be determined by the loser's offer if the offers diverge. We show that the offers converge in a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium without any additional condition. We also provide two methods to prevent an extreme arbitration result, in case the offers do not converge for some reasons.
机译:最终提供仲裁(FOA)是提出解决两种争议者之间的争执。虽然FOA被提出诱导两项争议自行达成协议,但是,当争议者有关于仲裁员的公平解决方案的概念的信息不完整时,FOA未能实现履行。本文提出了新的仲裁程序,这是对FOA的简单修正案,即仲裁结算如果提供分歧,则由失败者提供。我们表明,没有任何额外条件,所述优惠汇集了独特的纯策略纳什均衡。我们还提供了两种方法来防止极端仲裁结果,以防报价不会因某种原因而收敛。

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