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A Game Theoretical Extended Vickery Auction Mechanism for Replicating Data in Large-scale Distributed Computing Systems

机译:用于复制大型分布式计算系统中数据的游戏理论扩展Vickery拍卖机制

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This paper addresses the problem of fine-grained data replication on a set of Internet sites using the extended form of Vickrey auction called the N+1st price auction. Specifically, we present an adaptive auction mechanism for replication of objects in a distributed system. The mechanism is adaptive in the sense that it changes the replica schema of the objects by continuously moving the schema towards an optimal one, while ensuring object concurrency control. The mechanism is experimentally evaluated against three well-known techniques from the literature: greedy, branch and bound, and genetic algorithms. The experimental results reveal that the proposed approach outperforms the three techniques in both the execution time and solution quality.
机译:本文使用称为N + 1ST价格拍卖的vickrey拍卖的扩展形式,解决了一组Internet站点上细粒度数据复制的问题。具体地,我们介绍了一种用于复制分布式系统中对象的自适应拍卖机制。该机制是自适应的,因为它通过将架构连续地移动到最佳方法,同时确保对象并发控制来改变对象的副本模式。通过从文献的三种众所周知的技术进行实验评估该机制:贪婪,分支和束缚和遗传算法。实验结果表明,所提出的方法在执行时间和解决方案质量方面优于三种技术。

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