首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Processing Techniques and Applications(PDPTA'05) vol.3; 20050627-30; Las Vegas,NV(US) >A Game Theoretical Extended Vickery Auction Mechanism for Replicating Data in Large-scale Distributed Computing Systems
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A Game Theoretical Extended Vickery Auction Mechanism for Replicating Data in Large-scale Distributed Computing Systems

机译:大规模分布式计算系统中数据复制的博弈论扩展维氏拍卖机制

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This paper addresses the problem of finegrained data replication on a set of Internet sites using the extended form of Vickrey auction called the N+1st price auction. Specifically, we present an adaptive auction mechanism for replication of objects in a distributed system. The mechanism is adaptive in the sense that it changes the replica schema of the objects by continuously moving the schema towards an optimal one, while ensuring object concurrency control. The mechanism is experimentally evaluated against three well-known techniques from the literature: greedy, branch and bound, and genetic algorithms. The experimental results reveal that the proposed approach outperforms the three techniques in both the execution time and solution quality.
机译:本文解决了使用扩展形式的Vickrey拍卖(称为N + 1st拍卖)在一组Internet站点上细粒度数据复制的问题。具体来说,我们提出了一种自适应拍卖机制,用于在分布式系统中复制对象。从某种意义上说,该机制是自适应的,它通过在确保对象并发控制的同时,将模式不断地移向最佳模式来更改对象的复制模式。根据文献中的三种著名技术对这种机制进行了实验评估:贪婪,分支和约束以及遗传算法。实验结果表明,该方法在执行时间和解决方案质量上均优于这三种技术。

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