首页> 外文会议>ASME International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition >ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF AN INDUSTRIAL BOILER EXPLOSION (AND HOW HAZARD ANALYSIS COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT)
【24h】

ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF AN INDUSTRIAL BOILER EXPLOSION (AND HOW HAZARD ANALYSIS COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT)

机译:工业锅炉爆炸的根本原因分析(以及危险分析如何防止它)

获取原文

摘要

An explosion occurred in the firebox of an industrial boiler with a nominal fuel input rate of 100 MW (340 million Btu/hr), in a processing plant during final commissioning of the burner systems. This paper describes the investigation of the incident, root cause analysis, and lessons learned from the incident. The original burners in the boiler had recently been replaced with low NOx burners, and the facility was in the process of commissioning the new burner system. The boiler was running only on natural gas igniters at the time of the incident. While firing on igniters, an undetected stoppage of the control equipment occurred, which led to a restriction of airflow through the secondary air dampers. The boiler controls included programmable logic controllers (PLCs) for both the combustion control system (CCS) for regulation and the burner management system (BMS) for safety functions. The BMS was intended to detect a loss of control such as this and immediately stop fuel to the boiler; however, it did not. The BMS PLC was not configured to detect the dangerous states and allowed the igniters to continue to fire. An explosion subsequently occurred within the boiler firebox that caused extensive damages to the facility and equipment. This paper will describe the incident investigation and determination of multiple root causes for failure of the BMS to prevent the explosion. The inadequate configuration of the control systems was likely present for some time prior to the incident, and the explosion was eventually caused when the right conditions occurred during this commissioning. We found through the investigation that the BMS deficiencies could have been detected and prevented (and almost were) through standard hazard analysis techniques common in the chemical processing industries. This paper will also discuss how hazard analysis can be applied to detect and prevent similar system failures.
机译:在工业锅炉的火箱中发生爆炸,该燃烧器在燃烧器系统的最终调试期间的加工厂中的标称燃料输入速率为100 MW(BTU / HR)。本文介绍了从事件中汲取的事件,根本原因分析和经验教训的调查。锅炉中的原始燃烧器最近被低Nox燃烧器取代,设施是调试新燃烧系统的过程。锅炉仅在事件时的天然气点火器上运行。在点火器上射击时,发生控制设备的未检测到的停止,这导致通过二次空气阻尼器的气流限制。锅炉控制包括用于调节的燃烧控制系统(CCS)的可编程逻辑控制器(PLC),以及用于安全功能的燃烧器管理系统(BMS)。 BMS旨在检测丢失的控制,如这种控制,并立即停止燃料到锅炉;但是,它没有。 BMS PLC未配置为检测危险状态,并允许点火器继续射击。随后发生爆炸在锅炉火箱内,对设施和设备造成了广泛的损坏。本文将描述事件调查和确定BMS失败以防止爆炸的多根根本原因。在事件发生之前,控制系统的配置不​​足可能存在一段时间,并且最终在该调试期间发生的正确条件发生爆炸。我们通过调查发现,通过化学加工行业中常见的标准危险分析技术,可以检测到BMS缺陷(并且几乎是)。本文还将讨论如何应用危险分析来检测和防止类似的系统故障。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号