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Coordinated Exploration in Stochastic Common Interest Games

机译:随机共同利益游戏协调探索

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Recently we proposed a new exploration technique for individual reinforcement learners, which helps them to coordinate on the Pareto Optimal Nash equilibrium of a game. This technique in which agents may exclude one or more of the actions from their action space, can be seen as a discrete version of the traditional ε-greedy exploration technique. In this paper we refine this exploration technique further, with a standard technique from general search problems, i.e. random restarts. Due to this refinement, we are able to prove convergence to the Pareto Optimal Nash equilibrium in general stochastic common interest games. Moreover communication becomes unnecessary. Experiments show this technique on 2 challenging test problems and examine it's use in larger joint action spaces.
机译:最近,我们提出了一种为个人加强学习者提供了新的探索技术,这有助于他们协调游戏的帕累托最佳纳什均衡。这种技术可以从其动作空间中排除一个或多个动作的动作,可以看作是传统ε-贪婪探索技术的离散版本。在本文中,我们进一步优化了这种探索技术,具有来自一般搜索问题的标准技术,即随机重启。由于这种细化,我们能够在通用随机共同兴趣游戏中证明帕累托最佳纳什均衡的收敛性。而且沟通变得不必要。实验表明了这项技术在2个挑战性测试问题上,并检查它在更大的联合行动空间中使用。

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