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Information-based Incentivisation when Rewards are Inadequate

机译:当奖励不充分时,基于信息的激励

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In many cases, intermediaries play a major role in linking between service providers and their target users. Yet, attracting intermediaries at a marketplace to promote a service to their existing customers can be very challenging, since they are usually very busy and would incur additional cost as a result of such promotion. In response, this paper presents an information-based incentivisation framework, which combines financial rewards with other motivating information, in order to incentivise intermediaries at a marketplace to undertake service promotion. Specifically, the intermediaries are associated with a group of incentivising agents, capable of learning the individual motivational needs of these intermediaries, and accordingly target them with the most effective incentives. The incentivising agents collaborate with each other to gather motivational information, by sharing their observations on intermediaries. The proposed incentivisation approach is evaluated through a corresponding agent-based simulation, and the experimental results obtained demonstrate its effectiveness.
机译:在许多情况下,中介机构在联系服务提供商及其目标用户之间发挥着重要作用。然而,吸引在市场上的中介机构促进对现有客户的服务可能非常具有挑战性,因为它们通常很忙,而且由于这种促销而导致额外的成本。作为回应,本文提出了一种基于信息的激励框架,将财务奖励与其他激励信息相结合,以便激励市场的中介机构进行服务促销活动。具体而言,中间体与一组激励剂相关,能够学习这些中间体的个体诱导需求,并因此将它们定位在最有效的激励措施中。通过分享对中介机构的观察,激励刺激剂互相协作以收集动机信息。通过基于代理的模拟评估所提出的激励方法,并且获得的实验结果证明了其有效性。

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