The static game model and application of private equity companies' compliance management and government supervision

摘要

In recent years, China's private equity market has gradually developed and expanded, and potential risks have become increasingly prominent. Although the government has introduced a series of regulatory policies, the current private equity market in China is still dominated by self-discipline, with low market access thresholds and risk monitoring mechanisms. The system is not sound and the supervision is insufficient. In this context, this article is based on game theory to study the regulatory and regulated game behaviors between private equity fund companies (hereinafter referred to as private equity companies) and regulatory agencies. This article mainly analyzes the four game modes of "strong supervision" and "weak supervision" of regulators, and "compliant management" and "violating management" of private equity companies, and constructs a static game model between private equity companies and regulators. Then analyze the relevant factors that affect the decision-making of regulators and private equity companies. Finally, actual data is selected to analyze relevant influencing factors. The research in this article has practical reference value for the supervision of the private equity market.