An explanation of the Regulation Failure in the Taxicab Industry - Tested on the Case of the Taxi Regulation in Beijing

摘要

It is unsuccessful to regulate the whole taxi industry in Beijing, one of the evidences is the large difference between the result and objective. This article analyses the difference from the appearance and evolution of the regulation, and explain the reasons of regulation failure. In the recent years, as the increasing conflicts happening in taxi industry in China, deregulation, especially in the market admittance, becomes a trend gradually in many cities. In the area of market admittance, there was a regulation, deregulation, re-regulation process in the taxi industry of Beijing, but now they are still regulated strictly in many aspects. More and more articles start giving attention to the industry which includes outstanding conflicts. Wang Keqin (2002) described the suffering of the taxi drivers exploited by monopolization of the industry from the point of a reporter. Guo Yuzhan (2005) criticized the reasons for the regulation of unfair market entry and total amount control, and then indicated the reasonable regulation should be on the basis of taxi personalization; government should only regulate taxi service quality. Yu Hui (2003) thought the monopolization in Beijing taxi industry is a typical case of the government regulation failure. Generally, most of the articles are from the point of profit distribution to review the regulation effect. How can the regulation appear? How do the different interest groups affect the regulation policy? Is the regulation objective and final result accordant? This article tries to explain all the problems through reviewing the history of taxi industry regulation in Beijing.