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Strategyproof Mechanisms for 2-Facility Location Games with Minimax Envy

机译:具有Minimax Env​​y的2设施定位游戏的策略验证机制

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We study a fairness-based model for 2-facility location games on the real line where the social objective is to minimize the maximum envy over all agents. All the agents seek to minimize their personal costs, and the envy between any two of them is the difference in their personal costs. We consider two cases of personal costs, called min-dist and sum-dist cost. We are interested in investigating strategyproof mechanisms for 2-facility location games in both cases. In the case of min-dist personal cost, we prove that a lower bound of the additive approximation for any deterministic strategyproof mechanism is 1/4; then we propose a 1/2-additive approximate deterministic group strategyproof mechanism and a 1/4-additive approximate randomized strategyproof mechanism. In the case of sum-dist personal cost, we design an optimal and group strategyproof deterministic mechanism.
机译:我们在现实路线上研究了基于2个场所的定位游戏的基于公平性的模型,其社交目标是最大程度地减少对所有特工的最大嫉妒。所有代理商都试图将他们的个人成本降到最低,而他们两个之间的嫉妒是他们的个人成本之差。我们考虑两种情况的个人成本,分别称为“最小距离”和“总距离”成本。在这两种情况下,我们都有兴趣研究2设施定位游戏的策略验证机制。在最小距离个人成本的情况下,我们证明对于任何确定性策略证明机制,加法近似的下限为1/4;然后提出了一种1/2加法近似确定性群策略证明机制和一种1/4加法近似随机化策略证明机制。在总成本与个人成本相差不大的情况下,我们设计了一种最优的,可证明群体策略的确定性机制。

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