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Advanced Techniques for Designing Stealthy Hardware Trojans

机译:设计隐身的硬件特洛伊木马的先进技术

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The necessity of detecting malicious modifications in hardware designs has led to the development of various detection tools. Trojan detection approaches aim to reveal compromised designs using several methods such as static code analysis, side-channel dynamic signal analysis, design for testing, verification, and monitoring architectures etc. This paper demonstrates new approaches for circumventing some of the latest Trojan detection techniques. We introduce and implement stealthy Trojans designs that do not violate the functional specifications of the corresponding original models. The designs chosen to demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques correspond to encryption algorithms and a pseudo random number generator. The proposed Trojans are inserted into the original RTL, and decrease the overall security of the designs, minimizing detection probability by state-of-the-art static analysis tools.
机译:在硬件设计中检测恶意修改的必要性导致了各种检测工具的开发。特洛伊木马检测方法旨在利用静态代码分析,侧通道动态信号分析,测试,验证和监控架构等多种方法揭示受损设计。本文展示了避免一些最新的特洛伊木马检测技术的新方法。我们介绍并实施隐身的特洛伊木马设计,这些设计不会违反相应原始模型的功能规格。选择展示我们技术的有效性的设计对应于加密算法和伪随机数发生器。所提出的特洛伊木马将插入原版RTL,并降低设计的整体安全性,通过最先进的静态分析工具最小化检测概率。

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