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Kicking a robot dog

机译:踢一个机器人狗

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In February 2015, a video posted online by Boston Dynamics, showing a man kicking their quadruped robot ???Spot??? in order to demonstrate the robot's capacity to regain its balance, ???went viral???. A number of media websites subsequently published stories asking whether it was wrong to kick a robot dog. Most pundits seemed to conclude that there was nothing wrong with kicking a robot as long as doing so didn't encourage the kicker to go on to kick living things. In this presentation I want to revisit this controversy and argue that, according to one plausible ethical framework at least, kicking a robot may be wrong regardless of its impact on the future behavior of the kicker and/or the sufferings of other sentient creatures. An ???agent-based virtue ethics??? evaluates actions according to what they reveal about the character of an agent. That is to say, kicking a robot dog might be wrong simply because it reveals the kicker to be cruel or vicious in their dispositions. However, what our behavior towards robots says about us will also depend upon the behavior of the robot and, in particular, its capacity to express emotions that in turn determine the reasonableness of our interpretation of its treatment. In designing robots, then, we are also shaping the opportunities that users have to demonstrate virtues and vices in their interactions with the robot. I offer some tentative suggestions as to why it might often be more plausible to attribute vices than virtues on the basis of a person's treatment of a robot. I conclude with some observations about the ways in which this complexifies the project of the ethical design of robots.
机译:2015年2月,波士顿动态在线发布的视频,显示一个人踢他们的四足机器人???发现???为了展示机器人的能力来重新获得其平衡,???去了病毒性???。许多媒体网站随后发布了故事,询问踢球犬是否错了。大多数部队似乎得出结论,只要这样做,踢一个机器人就没有错了,这并没有鼓励踢球者继续踢掉生物。在本演示文稿中,我想重新审视这种争议并争辩说,根据一个合理的道德框架,无论其对踢球者的未来行为的影响和/还是其他感觉生物的痛苦,都可能是错误的。基于代理人的美德道德???根据他们揭示了代理人的特征的方式评估行动。也就是说,踢一个机器人狗可能是错误的,因为它揭示了踢球者在他们的处置中是残忍的或恶毒。然而,我们对机器人的行为都说关于我们的行为也将取决于机器人的行为,特别是它表达其表达情绪的能力,反过来决定了我们对其治疗的解释的合理性。在设计机器人时,我们还在塑造用户必须在与机器人的互动中展示美德和恶习的机会。我提供一些暂定的建议,为什么在一个人对机器人的待遇的基础上,它通常可能更合理地归因于宗教。我在一些关于这种复杂的方式的方式的观察结果结束了。

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