首页> 外文会议>International conference on genetic and evolutionary computation >Lorenz Equilibrium: Equitability in non-Cooperative Games
【24h】

Lorenz Equilibrium: Equitability in non-Cooperative Games

机译:洛伦兹均衡:非合作博弈中的均衡

获取原文

摘要

The most popular solution concept in game theory, Nash equilibrium, has some limitations when applied to real life problems. Nash equilibrium rarely assures maximal payoff. A possibility is to consider Pareto equilibrium, inspired from the standard solution concept in multi-criteria optimization, but the obtained equilibria often consists of a large set of solutions that is too hard to process. Our aim is to find an equilibrium concept that provides a small set of efficient solutions, equitable for all players. The Lorenz dominance relation is investigated in this respect. A crowding based differential evolution method is proposed for detecting the Lorenz-optimal solutions. Based on the Lorenz dominance relation, the Lorenz equilibrium for non-cooperative games is proposed. The Lorenz equilibrium consists of those Pareto-optimal solutions that are the most balanced and equitable solutions for all players. We propose to use Lorenz equilibrium for selecting one Nash equilibrium for games having several Nash equilibria.
机译:博弈论中最流行的解决方案概念,即纳什均衡,在应用于现实生活中存在一些局限性。纳什均衡很少保证最大的回报。一种可能性是考虑多标准优化中标准溶液概念的启发而产生帕累托平衡,但获得的平衡通常由一大堆难以处理的溶液组成。我们的目标是找到一个平衡概念,为所有参与者提供平等的一小套有效解决方案。在这方面研究了洛伦兹优势关系。提出了一种基于拥挤的差分进化方法来检测Lorenz最优解。基于洛伦兹优势关系,提出了非合作博弈的洛伦兹均衡。洛伦兹均衡包括那些帕累托最优解,它是所有参与者最平衡,最公平的解。我们建议使用Lorenz均衡为具有多个Nash均衡的博弈选择一个Nash均衡。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号