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Study on Pedestrian Twice-Crossing Behavior Based on Game Theory

机译:基于博弈论的行人两次交叉行为研究

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Based on game theory, this paper explores two pedestrian twice-crossing game benefit models under different situations. In a un-signal controlled road section, pedestrians and vehicles compete to obtain the right to cross the crosswalk, pedestrian, and drivers choose their own behavior according to the real traffic conditions and their character. Pedestrian twice-crossing behavior can be seen as the process of game behavior. The party in the process of the game obtains the right to cross, and the other party chooses to avoid and wait. This paper describes the game process between pedestrians and drivers, analyzes the characteristics of pedestrian behavior including crossing-speed, psychology, and delay. Finally, this paper studies the pedestrians' twice-crossing behavior on the southern section of Xiao ZHAI CBD crosswalk in Xi'an. and uses the pedestrian twice-crossing game benefit models to evaluate the setting of the crossing traffic facility and the management of the traffic control department.
机译:基于博弈论,本文在不同情况下探讨了两次行人两次交叉游戏效益模型。在一个不信号控制的道路部分,行人和车辆竞争以获得穿越人行横道,行人和司机的权利根据真正的交通状况及其性格选择自己的行为。行人两次交叉行为可以被视为游戏行为的过程。游戏过程中的一方获得了交叉的权利,另一方选择避免和等待。本文介绍了行人和司机之间的游戏过程,分析了行人行为的特征,包括交叉速度,心理学和延迟。最后,本文研究了西安萧寨南部南部的行人的两次交叉行为。并使用行人两次交叉游戏福利模型来评估交叉路交通设施的环境和交通管制部门的管理。

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