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The Analysis of Villages and Towns Civil Servants' Incentive Dilemma Based on Expectancy Theory

机译:基于寿命理论的村庄和城镇公务员激励困境分析

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The Chinese towns civil servants lack efficient incentive has become one of the important problems which the villages and towns government performance must solve. This paper references Victor H. Vroom' Expectancy Theory as a foundation, separately, from the effort-performance, performance-reward, rewardmeet three process expectations analysis the incentive dilemma of the villages and towns civil servants, including civil servants personal effortperformance expectation is low, performance-reward expectation is low and reward-meet expectation is low. In order to solve the problem, this paper designed a set of method to motivate township civil servant constitute self motivation, training motivation, performance incentive, assessment incentive, salary incentive and supervision incentive, hope it benefit to improve performance, and provide effective countermeasures and Suggestions to build a service-oriented government.
机译:中国城镇公务员缺乏有效的激励,已成为村庄和城镇政府绩效必须解决的重要问题之一。本文参考Victor H. vroom'寿命理论作为基础,分开,从努力性能,性能奖励,奖励三个过程预期分析村庄和城镇公务员的激励困境,包括公务员个人努力的预期较低,性能奖励期望低,奖励 - 满足期望低。为了解决问题,本文设计了一套促进乡镇公务员的方法,构成自我动机,培训动机,表现激励,评估激励,薪酬激励和监督激励,希望改善绩效,并提供有效的对策和提供有效的对策和建议建立面向服务的政府。

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