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The Analysis of Villages and Towns Civil Servants' Incentive Dilemma Based on Expectancy Theory

机译:基于期望理论的乡镇公务员激励困境分析

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The Chinese towns civil servants lack efficient incentive has become one of the important problems which the villages and towns government performance must solve. This paper references Victor H. Vroom' Expectancy Theory as a foundation, separately, from the effort-performance, performance-reward, rewardmeet three process expectations analysis the incentive dilemma of the villages and towns civil servants, including civil servants personal effortperformance expectation is low, performance-reward expectation is low and reward-meet expectation is low. In order to solve the problem, this paper designed a set of method to motivate township civil servant constitute self motivation, training motivation, performance incentive, assessment incentive, salary incentive and supervision incentive, hope it benefit to improve performance, and provide effective countermeasures and Suggestions to build a service-oriented government.
机译:中国城镇公务员缺乏有效的激励已经成为乡镇政府绩效必须解决的重要问题之一。本文以Victor H. Vroom的期望理论为基础,分别从努力绩效,绩效奖励,报酬三过程期望分析出发,对乡镇公务员的激励困境(包括公务员个人努力绩效期望)较低。 ,绩效回报期望值低,而满足奖励的期望值低。为了解决这一问题,本文设计了一套激励乡镇公务员构成自我激励,培训激励,绩效激励,考核激励,薪资激励和监督激励的方法,希望能有益于提高绩效,并提供有效的对策和措施。建立服务型政府的建议。

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