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Utilization of Process Monitoring Data in the Tokai Reprocessing Plant for Future Nuclear Security

机译:利用流程监测数据在Tokae后处理厂中进行未来的核安全性

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Japanese regulation of reprocessing safety and security was revised in March 2012, and almost all requirements except for nuclear material accountancy and control described in the INFCIRC225/rev.5 are included into the regulation. Because Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) has several nuclear facilities which contain Category Ⅰ or Ⅱ nuclear material, we have many things to do to meet the requirements within 2 years pursuant to the regulation. The requirements, for instance, include setting up of a limited access area around the protected area instead of guard area and setting up of secondary central alarm station (CAS) for unexpected fire and earthquake, and introduction of two person rule within an vital area and explosive material detection system at the entrance of an inner area. We have to complete all the requirements described in the regulation by the end of March 2014. In addition, we would like to establish more effective and efficient nuclear material security separately from the revised regulation. One of ideas we have is utilizing the process monitoring data for the nuclear material security. From a safety viewpoint, we have process monitoring systems to measure several kinds of data such as density, volume and radiation etc. depending on the material form. Those data includes information on Pu storage equipment in vital areas. Since our operators continuously observe the process monitoring data to know the operational condition including unusual change, we think that the various alarm information from the operators or equipments help to detect the risk of sabotage and unauthorized removal. As future challenge, we would like to establish a possible method of utilizing information which the process monitoring data provide us with because we believe the utilization of the process monitoring data in combination with the physical protection make it possible to give more effective and efficient nuclear material security.
机译:2012年3月修订了日文后处理安全和安全保障,除核材料会计和控制中的几乎所有要求,infcirc225 / Rev.5中描述的核材料会计和控制文件都包含在该规则中。由于Tokae再处理厂(TRP)有几种包含Ⅰ类或Ⅱ类核材料的核设施,因此我们有很多努力将根据监管达到2年内的要求。例如,要求包括在受保护区域周围设置有限的接入区域而不是保护区域,并设置Edift Central Alarms Station(CAS)以获得意外的火灾和地震,并在重要区域内引入两个人规则内部区域入口处的爆炸材料检测系统。我们必须在2014年3月底完成规定中描述的所有要求。此外,我们希望与修订后的监管分开建立更有效和高效的核材料安全。我们拥有的一个想法是利用流程监测数据进行核材料安全性。从安全观点来看,我们具有处理监控系统,以测量诸如密度,体积和辐射等的几种数据,具体取决于材料形式。这些数据包括有关重要领域的PU存储设备的信息。由于我们的运营商不断遵守过程监测数据,以了解包括不寻常的变化的操作条件,我们认为来自运营商或设备的各种警报信息有助于检测破坏和未经授权的拆除风险。作为未来的挑战,我们想建立利用流程监测数据为我们提供的信息的可能方法,因为我们相信流程监测数据的利用与物理保护组合可以提供更有效和高效的核材料安全。

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