With the expected expansion in nuclear programs, the IAEA will face many safeguards challenges in the coming decades due to increasing numbers of facilities and new types of facilities. Change and expansion will require the IAEA to plan carefully, both to ensure its effort is focussed on areas of greatest proliferation risk and to make optimal use of scarce safeguards resources. The IAEA’s safeguards system has evolved considerably since the 1960s, but some elements have remained unchanged. Continuing some of these traditional safeguards practices and approaches in a new and resource constrained safeguards environment may not be practicable or even desirable. It is important to recall the technical objective of safeguards, i.e. “… the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.” (INFCIRC/153, paragraph 28). While nuclear materials accountancy is a key safeguards measure, it is not the only, or even a necessary, measure for the IAEA to fulfil its technical objective. It is important that process (i.e. nuclear materials accountancy) not be a distraction from the goal (i.e. achieving the technical objective). For example, the current safeguards system maintains a strong reliance on independent verification of declared inventories, a verification concept that arose in a time when inventory verification was the entirety of the IAEA safeguards effort. A back to basics review of the allocation of IAEA safeguards effort may determine that these measures are not the best way to achieve the technical objective. This paper will revisit the concepts contained in the standard form comprehensive safeguards agreement and explore possibilities for achieving the technical safeguards objective without depending on detailed nuclear materials accountancy in its current form.
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