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Multi-Authority Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme on Ideal Lattices

机译:理想格上基于多权限密文策略属性的加密方案

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摘要

Ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic technology that provides fine-grained access control as well as data confidentiality. It enables one sender to encrypt the data for more receivers, and to specify a policy on who can decrypt the ciphertext using his/her attributes alone. However, most existing ABE schemes are constructed on bilinear maps and they cannot resist quantum attacks. In this paper, we propose a multi-authority CP-ABE (MA-CPABE) scheme on ideal lattices which is still secure in post-quantum era. On one hand, multiple attribute authorities are required when user's attributes cannot be managed by a central authority. On the other hand, compared with generic lattice, the ideal lattice has extra algebraic structure and can be used to construct more efficient cryptographic applications. By adding some virtual attributes for each authority, our scheme can support flexible threshold access policy. Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA) in the standard model under the ring learning with errors (R-LWE) assumption.
机译:基于密文策略属性的加密(CP-ABE)是一种很有前途的加密技术,可提供细粒度的访问控制以及数据机密性。它使一个发送者可以为更多接收者加密数据,并指定一个策略,确定谁可以单独使用其属性来解密密文。但是,大多数现有的ABE方案都是在双线性图上构建的,它们无法抵抗量子攻击。在本文中,我们提出了一种在理想晶格上的多权限CP-ABE(MA-CPABE)方案,该方案在后量子时代仍然很安全。一方面,当用户的属性不能由中央机构管理时,需要多个属性机构。另一方面,与普通晶格相比,理想晶格具有额外的代数结构,可用于构建更有效的密码学应用程序。通过为每个权限添加一些虚拟属性,我们的方案可以支持灵活的阈值访问策略。安全性分析表明,在带有错误的环学习(R-LWE)假设下,该标准模型在标准模型中对选择的纯文本攻击(CPA)是安全的。

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