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Incentive Constraint Mechanism for Senior Executives of Village Bank

机译:村镇银行高管人员激励约束机制

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摘要

In order to support the new rural construction and solve the problems of China's rural financial market, China Banking Regulatory Commission lowered the rural financial institutions admittance threshold in 2006 and set up many new-type rural financial institutions, so village banks come into being. However, the village banks didn't operate as well as expected in practice. Starting from the incentive constraint mechanism along with introducing reputation mechanism, this paper studied Incentive restraint mechanism for senior executives of village banks and analyzed the operation effect arising thereof. At last, this paper provides the corresponding policy suggestions.
机译:为了支持新农村建设和解决中国农村金融市场问题,中国银行业监督管理委员会于2006年降低了农村金融机构的准入门槛,并成立了许多新型农村金融机构,因此村镇银行应运而生。但是,村镇银行的运作不如预期。从激励约束机制和引入声誉机制入手,对村镇银行高管人员的激励约束机制进行了研究,并分析了由此产生的经营效果。最后,本文提出了相应的政策建议。

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