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Intergenerational redistribution of income through capital funding pension schemes: simulating the Dutch pension fund ABP

机译:通过资本融资养老金计划进行的代际收入再分配:模拟荷兰养老基金aBp

摘要

In most countries, the largest proportion of the pension benefits that are paid out to the elderly are brought together by the contributions of the active population. This type of financing is known as a Pay-As-You-Go-scheme. In this scheme, an important ‘chain of solidarity' covers for the pension of the preceding generation. So, there is a pattern of winners and losers that is caused by the rates of ageing of the populations, in combination with PAYG-pension schemes.In pension schemes based on the Capital Funding (CF) type, individuals of every generation build up a certain future pension claim. So, every generation builds up its own future pension benefit in this type of scheme. Hence, CF pension schemes are believed not to rely on income flows between generations, since every generation finances its own future pension. The advantage then is that there are no winners or losers, from the generational point of view at least, so that demographic developments cannot jeopardize the system. But, this only holds for Defined-Contribution (DC) pension systems. In practice, we also observe Defined-Benefit (DB) pension systems. In fact, the larger part of the occupational pensions schemes in the Netherlands are DB ones. For this type of schemes it holds that absence of intergenerational income flows is a too optimistic view, though the redistribution is not that strongly as in the case of PAYG schemes. The central question in this contribution is whether intergenerational redistribution of income occurs via Capital Funding in case of DB pension schemes in the Netherlands. To that end we analyse the Dutch civil servants' pension fund in the Dutch dynamic microsimulation model NEDYMAS.
机译:在大多数国家中,支付给老年人的养老金福利中,最大比例是由活跃人口的缴款汇集在一起​​的。这种融资方式称为“现收现付”计划。在该计划中,重要的“团结链”涵盖了上一代养老金。因此,由于人口老龄化率与现收现付制相结合,导致了赢家和输家的模式。在基于资本基金(CF)类型的养老金计划中,每一代人都积累了一个某些将来的养老金要求。因此,每一代人都在这种计划中建立自己的未来养老金。因此,据信CF养老金计划不依赖于两代人之间的收入流,因为每一代人都为其自己的未来养老金提供资金。这样做的好处是,至少从世代的角度来看,没有赢家或输家,因此人口发展不会危及该系统。但是,这仅适用于固定缴款(DC)养老金系统。在实践中,我们还遵守定额养恤金(DB)养老金制度。实际上,荷兰的职业养老金计划中有很大一部分是DB。对于这种类型的计划,它认为没有代际收入流动是一个过于乐观的观点,尽管重新分配不像现收现付计划那样强烈。在这一贡献中,核心问题是在荷兰有DB养老金计划的情况下,是否通过资本资助进行代际收入再分配。为此,我们在荷兰动态微观仿真模型NEDYMAS中分析了荷兰公务员的养老金。

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