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'Defining the national interest: Domestic sources of the French European monetary policy during the Mitterrand era'

机译:“界定国家利益:密特朗时代法国欧洲货币政策的国内来源”

摘要

The French European monetary policy during the Mitterrand years evolved through three stages: 1) defining the national interest, 1981-1983 (the first EMS crisis); 2) the deepening of the franc fort policy (1984-1992); 3) the consolidation of the franc fort policy, 1992-1993 (the second EMS crisis). The franc fort policy based on redefined national interest was epitomized by the French "U-turn" of 1983 and consolidated at the EMS crisis in 1992 and 1993. The process of redefining national interest reflected a specific feature of the French policy-making community. The implementation and consolidation of the franc fort policy had been led by technocratic elites. During the crisis period, especially during the 1982-83 EMS crisis, the role of the president and socialist politicians had been dominant. As socialism faded out, the political nature of the EMS decision was taken over by a technocratic decision. The deepening of the ideational consensus among economic elites redefined the French national interest in a way to make an exit from the EMS more difficult. In a later crisis, 1992-93, the defense of the franc was led more by the opinion from technocratic elites, including the economic bureaucrats of Trésor and Banque de France. Elite cohesion based on the Grands Corps system remained intact and facilitated the consensus on the redefinition of national interest. The increased democratic deficit between administrative elites and citizens brought a problem of the legitimacy of delegation. The self-justified delegation and a passive consensus on the European monetary integration came under doubt, leading to the crisis of the Maastricht referendum and the 1995 strike.
机译:法国在密特朗(Mitterrand)年期间的欧洲货币政策经历了三个阶段:1)定义国家利益,1981-1983年(第一次EMS危机); 2)法郎堡政策的深化(1984-1992); 3)合并1992-1993年的法兰克要塞政策(第二次EMS危机)。基于重新定义的国家利益的法兰克要塞政策以1983年的法国“掉头”为代表,并在1992年和1993年的EMS危机中得到了巩固。重新定义国家利益的过程反映了法国决策界的特定特征。法兰克要塞政策的实施和巩固是由技术官僚领导的。在危机期间,特别是在1982-83年EMS危机期间,总统和社会主义政治人物的角色一直占据主导地位。随着社会主义的淡出,EMS决定的政治性质被技术官僚的决定所取代。经济精英之间观念共识的加深重新定义了法国的国家利益,从而使退出EMS更加困难。在后来的一次危机(1992-93年)中,法郎的捍卫更多地由技术官僚精英(包括特雷索和法兰西银行的经济官僚)的观点所主导。基于Grands Corps系统的精英凝聚力保持不变,并促进了关于重新定义国家利益的共识。行政精英和公民之间日益增加的民主赤字带来了代表团合法性的问题。自我辩解的代表团和对欧洲货币一体化的消极共识受到质疑,导致马斯特里赫特公投危机和1995年罢工。

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  • 作者

    Lee Jae-Seung.;

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  • 年度 1997
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  • 入库时间 2022-08-20 21:04:46

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