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Investor heterogeneity and asymmetric volatility under short-sale constraints: Evidence from Korean fund market

机译:卖空限制下的投资者异质性和不对称波动性:来自韩国基金市场的证据

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摘要

This paper investigates two issues: whether there is heterogeneity for fund managers as investors and whether there is asymmetric volatility under short-sale constraints. If so, what are the driving factors in the Korean fund market? Fund return data from 2002 to 2008 are used to determine these factors. Specifically, for short-sale constraints, we test the hypothesis of difference of opinion developed by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Hong and Stein (2003). This hypothesis provides a unique opportunity to test directly the differences of opinion among fund managers that operate fund monies under short-sale constraints using asset-allocating strategies. The results of the GJR-GARCH model show an asymmetric volatility in returns and an increase in differences of opinion among fund managers, which extended to an increase in asymmetric volatility. Furthermore, the results of this study are consistent with the model of Hong and Stein (2003), which predicts that negative asymmetries are more likely to occur when there are large differences of opinion among fund managers. Therefore, our results imply that the overvaluation effect is more remarkable in funds for which a wider dispersion of the opinions of fund managers exists. These findings are consistent with Miller's (1977) intuition and Hong and Stein's (2003) model. In addition, our results also support the stochastic bubble hypothesis and are consistent with Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Wu (1997), even after controlling for fund characteristic variables.
机译:本文研究了两个问题:基金经理作为投资者是否存在异质性,以及在卖空约束下是否存在非对称波动性。如果是这样,韩国基金市场的驱动因素是什么?使用2002年至2008年的资金收益数据来确定这些因素。具体来说,对于卖空限制,我们检验了Chen,Hong和Stein(2001)以及Hong和Stein(2003)提出的观点差异假设。该假设提供了独特的机会,可以使用资产分配策略直接测试在卖空约束下运营资金的基金经理之间的观点差异。 GJR-GARCH模型的结果表明,收益率的不对称波动和基金经理之间的意见分歧增加,这扩大到了不对称波动率的增加。此外,这项研究的结果与Hong和Stein(2003)的模型一致,该模型预测,当基金经理之间的意见分歧很大时,负面的不对称性更有可能发生。因此,我们的结果表明,在存在基金经理意见分散的基金中,高估效应更加明显。这些发现与米勒(1977)的直觉以及洪和斯坦(2003)的模型相一致。此外,即使在控制了基金特征变量之后,我们的结果也支持了随机泡沫假说,并且与Blanchard和Watson(1982)和Wu(1997)一致。

著录项

  • 作者

    Sohn Pando; Seo Ji-Yong;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2015
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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