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Complexity, Efficiency, and Fairness of Multi-Product Monopoly Pricing

机译:多产品垄断定价的复杂性,效率和公平性

摘要

The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board administers the purchase and sale of wine and spirits and is mandated to charge a uniform 30% markup on all products. We use an estimated discrete choice model of demand for spirits, together with information on wholesale prices, to assess the implications of this policy. We find that failure to account for the correlation between demographics and consumption patterns leads to lower prices than those charged by a profit-maximizing, multi-product monopolist. Using product-specific markups leads to higher prices on average, less quantity consumed, an 11% increase in total profits, and greater welfare. The current one-size-fits-all pricing rule ignores variations in demand elasticities resulting in the implicit taxation of high-income and educated households by raising the prices of spirits they prefer (vodka and whiskey) while lowering the price of products favored by low-income and minority households (gin and rum).
机译:宾夕法尼亚州酒类控制委员会负责葡萄酒和烈酒的买卖,并被要求对所有产品统一收取30%的加价。我们使用对烈酒需求的估计离散选择模型以及批发价格信息来评估该政策的含义。我们发现,不考虑人口统计特征和消费模式之间的相关性会导致价格低于利润最大化的多产品垄断者收取的价格。使用特定于产品的加价会导致平均价格提高,消耗的数量减少,总利润增加11%并带来更大的福利。当前的“一刀切”定价规则忽略了需求弹性的变化,从而通过提高他们偏爱的烈酒(伏特加和威士忌)的价格,同时降低了低收入者所偏爱的产品的价格,导致对高收入和受过教育的家庭进行隐性征税。 -收入和少数民族家庭(杜松子酒和朗姆酒)。

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