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Is longer unemployment rewarded with longer job tenure?

机译:失业时间越长,工作任期越长,奖励越多?

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摘要

This paper examines whether or not a prolonged unemployment period can raise the quality of job matching after unemployment. We focus on job tenure as an indicator of a good quality job match after unemployment. We match two sets of Japanese administrative data compiled by the public employment security offices: one includes information about the circumstances of job seekers receiving unemployment insurance, and the other includes information about job seekers applying for jobs. We first show a negative relationship between unemployment duration and the subsequent job duration. Restricting the sample to job seekers who changed search behaviors in the final 59 days before expiration of unemployment insurance, we secondly show an even greater negative effect of unemployment duration on the following job duration. The importance lies not only in the duration of unemployment. If job seekers keep a high reservation wage and a low search intensity because of the benefits of unemployment insurance, and change them in response to the expiration of insurance, prolonged unemployment will result in short job duration after unemployment.
机译:本文研究延长失业时间是否可以提高失业后的工作匹配质量。我们专注于工作任期,作为失业后优质工作匹配的指标。我们将公共就业保障办公室收集的两套日本行政数据进行匹配:一套包含有关求职者获得失业保险的情况的信息,另一套包含有关求职者申请工作的信息。我们首先显示失业时间与随后的工作时间之间存在负相关关系。将样本限制为在失业保险期满前的最后59天内改变了搜索行为的求职者,其次,我们证明了失业时间对随后的工作时间的负面影响更大。重要性不仅在于失业期间。如果求职者由于失业保险的好处而保持较高的保留工资和较低的搜寻强度,并根据保险到期而对其进行改变,那么长时间的失业将导致失业后的工作时间缩短。

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