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Mistakes and moral blameworthiness: An account of the excusing force of faultless mistakes of fact and faultless mistakes of morality

机译:错误和道德上的责任归咎:事实无误和道德无误的借口

摘要

It is a commonplace to hold that faultless mistakes of fact justify--or, at least, excuse--an agent's actions. Less prominent, however, is the view that faultless mistakes about morality similarly come to bear on our attributions of moral blameworthiness. My aim in this dissertation is to defend what I call the symmetry thesis: faultless mistakes of morality excuse just as do faultless mistakes of fact. Opposition to this thesis, I think, falls out of an incorrect understanding of the way in which faultless mistakes of fact come to bear on our attributions of moral responsibility. Accordingly, much of the dissertation is composed of an analysis of the excusing force of faultless mistakes of fact. Chapter 1 argues that faultless mistakes of fact are appropriately deemed excused, not justified, by morality and the law. Chapter 2 develops a challenge to what I call the traditional analysis of the excusing force of mistakes. This view holds that an agent's faultless mistake is excusing if, and only if, the mistake undermines, displaces, or, as they say in the criminal law, "negatives" the agent's subjective culpability. I suggest that concerns about voluntariness, not subjective culpability, are in order. Chapter 3 develops an account of voluntariness. I argue that an agent's actions are voluntary enough for an attribution of responsibility only if he did what he is accused of doing because this is something he was willing to do (in the fashion in which it was done)--only if, that is, what he did conforms to his will. Chapter 4 then applies this account of the excusing force of faultless mistakes of fact to cases of faultless mistakes of morality. I conclude that an agent is morally blameworthy for his actions only if he believes that what he is doing is wrong, it is true that what he is doing is wrong, and his reasons for so believing properly identify the features of his actions that make them wrong.
机译:普遍存在的事实是,无误的事实错误证明(或至少是借口)代理人的行为是合理的。然而,不那么突出的观点是,关于道德的无误错误同样会影响我们对道德责任的归因。我在这篇论文中的目的是捍卫我所说的对称性命题:道德的完美错误和事实的完美错误都是借口。我认为,对这一论点的反对来自对正确的事实错误对我们的道德责任归因的错误理解。因此,本文的大部分内容是对事实无误的辩解力的分析。第1章认为,道德和法律适当地认为事实的过错是免责的,而不是正当的。第2章提出了一种挑战,我称之为对错误原谅的传统分析。这种观点认为,只有且仅当错误破坏,取代或如刑法中所说的“否定”代理人的主观罪责时,代理人的过错才是借口。我建议对自愿性而非主观罪责的关注是有序的。第三章阐述了自愿性。我认为,代理人的行为是自愿的,只有当他做了被指责的事情时才足以将责任归因,因为这是他愿意做的事情(以做事的方式)-只有在这种情况下, ,他的所作所为符合他的意愿。然后,第四章将对事实无误的借口的解释适用于道德无误的案例。我得出的结论是,只有当代理人相信自己在做的事情是错误的,确实在做的事情是错误的,并且他如此相信的原因才能正确地识别其行为的特征时,才为自己的行为道义上的责任错误。

著录项

  • 作者

    Price Terry L. 1966-;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 1998
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 en_US
  • 中图分类
  • 入库时间 2022-08-31 15:19:15

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