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Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation And Big4 EffectudOn Audit Quality: Evidence From South Korea

机译:强制性审计事务所轮换与Big4效果 ud关于审计质量:韩国的证据

摘要

In South Korea, due to concurrent fnancial scandals, Korean legislators implementedudtwo major audit policies in the 2000s; the mandatory audit “partner” rotation policyudin 2000 and the mandatory audit “frm” rotation policy in 2006. The mandatory auditud“frm” rotation policy was introduced as a mean to improve audit quality based onudthe auditor entrenchment hypothesis. In this paper, we compare the audit quality ofudfrms subjected to mandatory audit “frm” rotation with two benchmark groups, audsample that adopted the policy voluntarily; the second group consists of the mandatoryud“frm” rotation sample in years prior, a period frms were subject to mandatory auditud“partner” rotation. Using accrual-based measures as proxies for audit quality, we fndudevidence that audit quality of the mandatory rotation frm sample is lower compared toudfrms that voluntarily adopted the policy. Furthermore, we fnd evidence that audit qualityudof the mandatory rotation frm sample is lower compared to the mandatory audit partnerudfrm sample. Additionally, we also fnd evidence that the mandatory audit frms rotationudsample whose auditors were rotated from Non-Big4 to Big4 are generally associated withudlower levels of abnormal accruals consistent with the argument that the audit quality ofudBig4 accounting frms is superior to Non-Big4 frms. Finally, longer audit tenure andudswitches to Big4 audit frms generally have a positive effect upon audit quality. Theseudfndings suggest that extended audit tenure improves audit quality due to accounting frm’s
机译:在韩国,由于并发的金融丑闻,韩国立法者在2000年代实施了 ud两项主要审计政策;强制性审计“合作伙伴”轮换政策 udin 2000和2006年强制性审计“ udm”轮换政策。引入了强制性审计 udm“ frm”轮换政策,以提高基于审计师根深蒂固假设的审计质量。在本文中,我们将接受强制性审计“ frm”轮换的 udfrms的审计质量与两个基准组(一个自愿采用该政策的 udsample)进行比较;第二组包括几年前的强制性 ud“ frm”轮换样本,期间frms则接受强制性审计 ud“ partner”轮换。使用基于权责发生制的度量作为审计质量的代理,我们发现证据表明,与自愿采用该政策的 udfrms相比,强制性轮换样本的审计质量较低。此外,我们发现有证据表明,强制性轮换样本的审计质量 ud比强制性审计伙伴 udfrm样本低。此外,我们还发现有证据表明,其审计师从Non-Big4转到Big4的强制性审计框架轮换 udsample通常与应计异常水平较低相关,这与 udBig4会计框架的审计质量优于非Big4帧。最后,更长的审计任期和 ud切换到Big4审计框架通常会对审计质量产生积极影响。这些发现表明,由于会计框架的原因,延长审计任期可以提高审计质量

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