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A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline

机译:PPP项目管道的顺序采购模型

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摘要

Public-private partnerships have seen the daylight in response to the adagio that project responsibilities and risks should be efficiently allocated between the public and the private sector. Nevertheless, the considerable bidding costs inhibit the competition in the market. A trustworthy project agenda, also called a project pipeline, could substantiate the PPP market’s attractiveness in the belief that a current success results in a knowledge and cost advantage in future tenders. This paper builds a sequential PPP procurement model and heuristically approximates the Markov perfect equilibrium in which contractors determine how much money they are willing to invest in the bid preparation and which mark-up is appropriate for each project in the pipeline. A pipeline of projects pushes down the mark-ups and the government procurement cost. Nonetheless, according to the experiments, it are only players with an initial experiential advantage who tend to make higher investment efforts so that additional governmental policies, like a fractional reimbursement of the bid preparation efforts, might be required to level the playing field.
机译:公共部门和私营部门之间的合作关系日趋白热化,即项目责任和风险应在公共部门和私营部门之间有效分配。然而,可观的投标成本抑制了市场竞争。值得信赖的项目议程(也称为项目管道)可以证明PPP市场的吸引力,因为他们相信当前的成功会带来未来招标的知识和成本优势。本文建立了一个顺序的PPP采购模型,并通过启发式近似马尔可夫完美平衡,在该平衡中,承包商确定他们愿意在投标准备中投资多少钱,以及哪种加价适合管道中的每个项目。大量项目减少了加价幅度和政府采购成本。尽管如此,根据实验,只有具有初始经验优势的参与者倾向于加大投资力度,因此可能需要其他政府政策(例如部分补偿投标准备工作)来公平竞争。

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