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Impact of US Derivatives Accounting Policy (SFAS 133) on Income Smoothing Choices and Disclosure of Derivatives Related Information

机译:美国衍生品会计政策(SFAS 133)对收入平滑选择和衍生品相关信息披露的影响

摘要

This study is on the effects of United States (US) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards number 133 (SFAS 133), Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and Hedging Activities, which was introduced in 2001. The first area of investigation focuses on the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing through the application of derivatives and discretionary accruals. The second key aspect is how SFAS 133 influences the disclosure of derivatives related information. Addressing these two issues together, provides an integrated understanding of how accounting policy can affect both risk management and risk disclosure choices.The study comprises a detailed literature review of extant empirical and analytical studies. It primarily extends the work of studies that initially looked at derivatives and discretionary accruals as income smoothing substitutes, such as Barton (2001) and Rajgopal and Pincus (2002). The theoretical framework developed during the literature review, discusses the genesis and key features of SFAS 133, and the determinants of the two key income smoothing choices of derivatives use and discretionary accruals. These include capital markets, managerial risk and corporate governance determinants. In addition, the theoretical framework outlines how SFAS 133 fair value recognition requirements can influence disclosure of related information through the footnotes. It presents the argument that the extent to which notes are complementary to recognition and measurement requirements should outweigh the extent to which they may be considered substitutes. It further describes the literature on disclosure incentives, including capital markets, proprietary cost concerns, managerial talent, managerial risk incentives based on compensation and litigation cost. This is as a precursor to the univariate and multivariate empirical testing of 1999 to 2003 data from 253 US firms (i.e. 850 firm-year observations).In conducting the empirical testing, I endeavour to address the problems of model endogeneity that could arise due to derivatives use and discretionary accruals being determined jointly. I also address the individual effects that arise due to the application of panel data. A key empirical finding is that after adopting SFAS 133, corporate managers increase discretionary accruals. However, there is no conclusive multivariate evidence of SFAS 133 reducing derivatives use, as hypothesized. An additional finding is that there is a substitution relationship between derivatives use and discretionary accruals. However, I also find that SFAS 133 adoption weakens the extent to which accruals influences derivatives use, but not the other way round. This latter finding suggests a partial substitution relationship exists after SFAS 133 and lends itself to a number of plausible explanations. These include accruals being complements rather than substitutes to derivatives use, after SFAS 133. SFAS 133 could trigger either increased earnings volatility or the greater use of speculative derivatives. Either of these could then induce the increased use of accruals in a manner that confounds the income smoothing substitution relationship.Despite the substitution relationship, the use of derivatives to smooth income is more akin to economic reality, as derivatives use also influences cash flow and fundamental economic volatility. Thus the finding that managers increase their use of accruals in general, after SFAS 133, suggests that SFAS 133 adoption, results in choices that are less beneficial to shareholders. I come to this conclusion based on the empirical evidence of Huang, Deis, Zhang and Moffit (2009). Their study shows that for income smoothing purposes, derivatives enhance shareholder value to a greater extent than the use of accruals. Further to the study of its impact on income smoothing, the empirical findings of SFAS 133 on derivatives related disclosure, build a collective picture of how different reporting practices can be influenced by accounting policy. The study finds a significant positive association between SFAS 133 and derivative information disclosure index, in all the models. This suggests that the derivatives recognition and measurement requirements have encouraged the provision of greater disclosures. The results also show a significant positive association of capital markets incentives measured as the logarithm of trading volume. However, there is no evidence of association of proprietary costs. The results further show that auditor expertise and the level of derivatives use are positively associated with observed derivatives disclosure levels. In the same vein, litigation risk and discretionary accrual levels have a negative association.In sum, this study shows that SFAS 133 adoption has potentially adverse consequences on income smoothing choices, but at the same time it has positive consequences through its encouraging disclosures that lower the information asymmetry on risk exposures.
机译:这项研究是针对2001年引入的美国财务会计准则第133号(SFAS 133),衍生工具和套期活动的会计的影响。第一个研究领域集中于SFAS 133的影响通过应用衍生工具和任意应计收益来平滑收入。第二个关键方面是SFAS 133如何影响衍生产品相关信息的披露。一起解决这两个问题,就可以全面了解会计政策如何影响风险管理和风险披露选择。该研究包括对现有经验研究和分析研究的详细文献综述。它主要扩展了研究工作,这些研究最初将衍生工具和可自由支配的应收款作为收入平滑替代品,例如Barton(2001)以及Rajgopal和Pincus(2002)。文献综述期间建立的理论框架讨论了SFAS 133的起源和关键特征,以及衍生工具使用和自由应计收益的两个关键收入平滑选择的决定因素。这些包括资本市场,管理风险和公司治理的决定因素。此外,理论框架还概述了SFAS 133公允价值确认要求如何通过脚注影响相关信息的披露。它提出了这样的论点,即注释对识别和计量要求的补充程度应大于它们可被视为替代的程度。它进一步描述了有关披露激励措施的文献,包括资本市场,专有成本问题,管理人才,基于薪酬和诉讼成本的管理风险激励措施。这是对1999年至2003年来自253家美国公司的数据进行单变量和多变量实证检验(即850个企业年的观察值)的先驱。在进行实证检验时,我致力于解决模型内生性问题。衍生工具的使用和任意应计费用共同确定。我还将讨论由于面板数据的应用而产生的个体影响。一个重要的经验发现是,采用SFAS 133后,公司经理增加了酌处应计费用。但是,如假设的那样,没有确凿的多元证据表明SFAS 133减少了衍生物的使用。另一个发现是,衍生工具的使用与应计应计利润之间存在替代关系。但是,我也发现SFAS 133的采用削弱了权责发生制对衍生品使用的影响程度,反之则相反。后一个发现表明在SFAS 133之后存在部分替代关系,并为许多可能的解释提供了依据。这些包括在SFAS 133之后的应计费用是对衍生产品使用的补充而不是替代。SFAS133可能会导致收益波动性增加或投机性衍生产品的更多使用。这两种方式中的任何一种都可能导致应计利润的使用增加,从而混淆了收入平滑替代关系。尽管存在替代关系,但使用衍生工具来平滑收入更类似于经济现实,因为使用衍生工具也会影响现金流量和基本面经济动荡。因此,在SFAS 133之后,管理人员普遍增加了对权责发生制的使用结果表明,采用SFAS 133会导致对股东不利的选择。我根据Huang,Deis,Zhang和Moffit(2009)的经验证据得出这个结论。他们的研究表明,出于收益平滑的目的,衍生工具比使用权责发生制更大程度地提高了股东价值。除了研究其对收入平滑的影响外,SFAS 133关于衍生工具相关披露的实证研究结果,还构成了有关会计政策如何影响不同报告方式的集体描述。研究发现,在所有模型中,SFAS 133与衍生信息披露指数之间均存在显着正相关。这表明衍生工具的确认和计量要求鼓励提供更多的披露信息。结果还表明,以交易量的对数衡量,资本市场激励机制具有显着的正相关性。但是,没有证据表明专有成本会增加。结果进一步表明,审计师的专业知识和衍生产品的使用水平与观察到的衍生产品披露水平呈正相关。同样,诉讼风险与酌处权应计水平之间存在负相关关系。总而言之,本研究表明采用SFAS 133对收入平滑选择有潜在的不利影响,但同时通过鼓励降低税率的披露也具有积极的影响风险暴露的信息不对称性。

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    Papa Vincent;

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