Management of Regional Fisheries Organisations: An Application of the Shapley211 Value

摘要

In this paper, the authors examine a game theoretic setting in which four211u001ecountries have established a regional organization for the conservation and 211u001emanagement of straddling and high migratory fish stocks as recommended by the 211u001eUnited Nations Convention. These countries consist of two coastal states and two 211u001edistant water fishing nations (DWFNs). A characteristic function game approach is 211u001eapplied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation. The 211u001eauthors are specifically interested in the effect of possible coalition 211u001erestrictions on these shares. According to the authors' results the distant water 211u001efishing nations, by refusing to joint with the coastal states, can improve their 211u001enegotiation position if their fishing costs are high. In addition, the authors 211u001eare also allowing for unlimited number of fishing nations in the regional 211u001efisheries organization. The veto players always receive an equal share of the 211u001ebenefits and the least efficient country is seen to make no contribution to the 211u001ecooperative management regime.