Detecting Low-Profile Probes and Novel Denial-of-Service Attacks.

摘要

Attackers use probing attacks to discover host addresses and services available on each host. Once this information is known, an attacker can then issue a denial-ofservice attack against the network, a host, or a service provided by a host. These attacks prevent access to the attacked part of the network. Until recently, only simple, easily defeated mechanisms were used for detecting probe attacks. Attackers defeat these mechanisms by creating stealthy low-profile attacks that include only a few, carefully crafted packets sent over an extended period of time. Furthermore, most mechanisms do not allow intrusion analysts to trade off detection rates for false alarm rates. We present an approach to detect stealthy attacks, an architecture for achieving real-time detections with a confidence measure, and the results of evaluating the system. Since the system outputs confidence values, an analyst can trade false alarm rate against detection rate.