Assessing the Security and Survivability of Transportation Control Networks

摘要

Cyber attacks and electronic sabotage targeted against these vulnerabilities have the capability of inducing transportation disruptions over very large geographic areas. Loss of life, property, production, and service may result from those outages. With the financial support of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and DOT's Research and Special Programs Administration, we undertook a two year study of similar vulnerabilities with the electric power infrastructure. Our analyses of cascading failures within the electric power grid demonstrate that catastrophic failure is fraught with common mode faults. Post-mortem analyses show that these vulnerabilities can be identified and modeled using methods we call Common Mode Failure Analysis (CMFA) and Survivability Systems Analysis (S/SSA). When used together CMFA and S/SSA provide effective tools to identify network vulnerabilities, and point the way toward mitigation strategies and design parameters that can be used to construct more robust and survivable control networks. In this project we adapted our CMFA and S/SSA processes to make hem applicable to transportation control networks. We exemplify this work with a security and survivability analysis of the proposed City of Moscow Intelligent Transportation System.