International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention

摘要

The study examines the political, organizational, legal, financial and technical aspects of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) experience. The non-technical aspects focus on the significant features of both the Agency's internal structure and operations and the broader environment in which it must function. The study looks at the approach to the control problem taken by the Agency-its definition of the problem and of its own objectives-and the coverage it provides with respect to possible routes for acquisition of nuclear weapons. It considers the factors affecting the Agency's political and technical effectiveness. Recognizing that the Agency's roots lie in the promotion of the benefits of peaceful uses of atomic energy, the study examines the political base of the Agency's activities, in the power of suppliers of nuclear goods and services and in the existence of a broad norm or presumption against the spread of nuclear weapons. It also examines some issues arising from the use of an international organization for the performance of verification tasks.