Kosovo: Redefining Victory in an Era of Limited War

摘要

NATO's war against Serbia, officially dubbed Operation Allied Force, resulted in a clear and compelling victory. Serbian President Milosevic publicly conceded defeat and agreed to NATO demands for withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, return of the refugees, and insertion of a NATO-led international peacekeeping force. Moreover, during the 78-day operation, substantial damage was inflicted on Serb military capability, industry, and infrastructure, with some casualty estimates exceeding 5,000 Serb soldiers, while NATO maintained an astonishing record of zero combat casualties. In this first true combat engagement of NATO's existence, the Alliance displayed an extraordinary degree of political unity, coalition interoperability, and overall military effectiveness. Yet, despite this impressive performance, the war has sparked a firestorm of controversy among American national security strategists and has been the subject of widespread criticism from across the political spectrum. The operation has been characterized variously as a fiasco, a perfect failure, and a miscalculation that ranks with the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam. Even the few examples of more charitable commentary have levied severe judgments on the war's dark victory and ambiguous results and its noble effort left more than half undone. In stark contrast to the exuberant reaction of Secretary Hay and most other Americans to the Spanish-American war a century prior, Kosovo has engendered an almost consensus response of consternation if not outright condemnation.