Overcoming the 'Supreme Nuisance': Command Relationships in Amphibious Operations

摘要

Revisions to JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations have been held up for years over the issue of command relationships between Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander, Landing Force (CLF). The current doctrine is a legacy of World War II, when amphibious operations were conducted as Wavy/Marine Corps operations in a theater where a Joint Force Commander (JFC) had little to do with the actual direction of the operation. Today's world is radically different, and the JFC is prime. Our doctrine contains four legacies of the 1940's that require updating. First, amphibious operations no longer accomplish naval missions; they are joint operations that accomplish joint missions. Second, an amphibious operation is no more complex than any other joint operation; no longer is Navy expertise required, or even available, 'at the helm'. Third, maritime componency no longer achieves unity of command; the JFC achieves unity of effort. Unity of command may not be required at any echelon below that of the joint force. Finally, CATF no longer has the control over his ADA that our doctrine presupposes; the battlespace belongs to the JFC. The impasse over command relationships can be overcome, and workable joint amphibious doctrine provided to its users, by organizing forces that conduct amphibious operations as we would any other joint force. By capitalizing on the common relevant operating picture offered by NCW, and assuming the 'virtual presence' of service components in an ATF, we can organize an amphibious task forces as a Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF). Once so organized, a JATF may use the entire spectrum of command and support relationships available to any other JTF.