Joint Qualified Flag Officer Development: Is Production Broken

摘要

Given the timeframe which has passed since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, we are beginning to see the first generation of 'joint qualified' Flag officers produced with respect to the by-products, or intent, of that and subsequent legislation. Due to training and experience requirements set forth, one could assume that the leaders of the United States Armed Forces are not only well versed in Joint Doctrine, but that they are capitalizing on the varied and valuable virtues of 'Jointness'... or are they. This paper is a case study examination of Operation Anaconda, its commander MG Franklin L. Hagenbeck, his qualifications, existing Flag Officer requirements, and whether there is a systemic problem inherent in developing future joint force commanders. This thesis will show that the building blocks necessary for developing a future joint commander are present and are generally capable of producing the desired qualifications needed in a leader, however enhancements to the process should be formalized in order to help guarantee future successes. Enhancements which include working with USJFCOM to further institutionalize joint training from pre-commissioning throughout an individual's military career, reorganizing the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, expanding the Joint Operations Module within the CAPSTONE curriculum, and integrating new training concepts like the Standing Joint Force Headquarters will increase future joint force commander efficiency.