Army Transformation 1953-1961: Lessons of the 'New Look' Army

摘要

The intent of this research paper is to examine the transformation of the U.S. Army during the Eisenhower Administration. Due to the administration's New Look strategy the U.S. Army was forced to examine its role and relevance in light of a new strategic environment that relied almost exclusively on strategic bombing and nuclear weapons. However the administration offered frustratingly little guidance on how the Army should accomplish this mission other than cutting its budget and structure. Faced with what was thought to be a revolution of military affairs (RMA) the Army undertook dramatic changes: extensively reorganizing the division embracing the technology of guided missiles enlarging the role of air defense and experimenting to understand the techniques tactics and procedures needed to operate on the 'atomic' battlefield--all at the expense of developing conventional weapons due to misplaced confidence in 'emerging' technology that was projected for fielding. As the Army went through these changes it experienced significant cultural uncertainty and professional debate. However at the end of the Eisenhower administration there was strong feeling that this transformation was misguided as evidenced by the impermanence of the New Look transformational changes. The Army quickly suspended the Pentomic reorganization and the Kennedy Administration adopted the concept of Flexible Response. During this transformation two successive Chiefs of Staff grappled with a highly controversial Secretary of Defense highlighting the numerous shortcomings of the New Look policy. Their greatest concern was that the Army was not prepared to fight in limited wars which was exactly the type of conflict the Army later faced. This scenario is worth examining as the Army 50 years later faces some of the same issues of trying to 'get it right' in transformation.