ROK's Nuclear Experiments: A Successful Case of Alliance Management. Asia-Pacific Security Studies. Volume 4, Number 4, March 2005

摘要

The disclosure by the government of South Korea (ROK) on September 2, 2004 that a small group of its scientists had conducted secret nuclear experiments in 1982 and 2000 led to two developments that threatened to complicate the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. First, South Korea and the United States held conflicting views over the disposition of the ROK's nuclear issue by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, second, North Korea attempted to use the incident to pursue its own self- interested agenda. The ROK government opposed the IAEA from reporting the nuclear experiments to the Security Council for possible sanctions because Seoul was worried that the referral would interfere with the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem and improving its relations with North Korea. While the US government demanded strict accounting of ROK's nuclear experiments, it wanted to avoid undue friction with ROK over the disposition of the nuclear issue in order to secure ROK's cooperation in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. The intense lobbying by ROK to contain the fallout from the incident and the circumspect role of the US in handling the disposition of the nuclear issue effected a favorable decision by the IAEA's Board of Governors not to refer ROK to the Security Council. North Korea (DPRK) tried to parlay the incident not only to deflect criticism of its suspected nuclear arms program by placing the onus for the nuclear problem on ROK and US, but also into a possible bargaining chip in the six- party talks to extract concessions from the other countries. ROK and US resolved their differences over the disposition of the nuclear issue through mutual understanding and restraint.