Mayaguez Incident: An Organizational Theory Analysis

摘要

Applying selected concepts of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 1975 leads to a more comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons learned. Application of organizational theory to the incident demonstrates that the decision processes at the executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure. Henry Mintzberg's structural contingency model and Lee Bowman and Terrence Deal's frames model within organizational theory are applied to the executive-level decisions made during the operation. The rationale behind focusing on executive-level decision making is twofold: first, it is where final critical decisions were made, and second, military operations cannot take place without an executive-level authorization. The Mayaguez crisis was rife with potential pitfalls and, though President Ford was equipped with an excellent organization of intelligent, competent personnel, the result was unnecessary loss of life. Publicly, the operation was a success and President Ford was the savior of the Mayaguez crew. To the military, the operation was an embarrassment, all because of failures that occurred within the organizational structure and poor decision making. Application of organizational theory provides an avenue for analysis of the military operation within the Mayaguez rescue.