Who Is Responsible for Stability and Reconstruction

摘要

Although planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq began just weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, attention to post-conflict operations was ineffective and, in many cases, completely overlooked. There was apparent confusion as to whether the Department of Defense or the Department of State had planning responsibility. Many of the planning assumptions were overly optimistic and naive, and some were just flat wrong. The reason why every level of command from strategic to tactical ineffectively planned for post-conflict operations may be found in the American cultural understanding of when and how to go to war. The requirement that the U.S. military plan and conduct stability and reconstruction operations should not be a surprise. There are many examples of post-conflict operations in American military experience. Even if a Department of State-led coalition is created and various federal agencies are involved in stability and reconstruction operations, it will be the professional military officer that executes the operation. In all future U.S.- led and coalition operations, the American soldier will be required for Phase IV operations and should be prepared for them. There are six major historical observations that may be useful when comparing stability and reconstruction decisions and the actions taken by strategic, operational, and tactical commanders during the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Examining each of these observations in relationship to each other and to the planning considerations for OIF may explain how commanders at all levels could have misunderstood the full requirements for post-combat operations.