Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities

摘要

Conclusion: The main concern of insurgency efforts should be to influence the behavior and action of the populace rather than their loyalties and attitudes. The leadership of countries in which insurgent movements appear can do much to influence the behavior and actions of the populace in ways that will make the operation of the insurgent system substantially more difficult, and will facilitate successful implementation of counterinsurgency programs. At the operational level of specific programs and measures to prevent or control the growth of insurgency, the main thrust of the approach is to focus attention on the difficulties (or opportunities) that would be created for the insurgent system by implementation of a proposed program or measure. The primary consideration should be whether the proposed measure is likely to increase the cost and difficulties of insurgent operations and help to disrupt the insurgent organization rather than whether it wins popular loyalty and support, or whether it contributes to a more productive, efficient or equitable use of resources. Perhaps one major attitudinal effect of the alternative approach may be to modify the attitudes with which counter-insurgency efforts are approached and viewed in the United States. Insurgency may be recognized not as an inscrutable and unmanageable force grounded in the mystique of a popular mass movement, but as a coherent operating system that needs to be understood structurally and functionally if it is to be effectively countered.