Civil-Military Relations in Mexico: A Way Ahead

摘要

Mexico is currently in the process of transitioning to a democracy after over 71 years of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) authoritarian regime. The PRI lost their grip on power in Mexico in 2000 when President Fox was the first non-PRI president elected in over seven decades. During this period of PRI rule, the Mexican military and the PRI leadership operated under an implicit 'pact' that secured the military's loyalty to the PRI party in return for high levels of autonomy free from civilian interference. While Mexico is now attempting to consolidate its democratic gains over the last decade, the military still enjoys an unhealthy amount of autonomy and freedom from civilian control and oversight. This paper discusses the current relationship between civilian and military leaders in Mexico, and how the lack of effective civilian control poses a risk to Mexico's democratic future. For Mexico to achieve its democratic aspirations, the Mexican armed forces must be subject to civilian authorities, both in the executive and legislative branches of government. This paper argues that to improve and institutionalize civilian control of the military, Mexico must establish a civilian-led Ministry of Defense (MoD) that is accountable to the government. The paper provides arguments on how the establishment of a MoD and increased legislative oversight will improve the civil-military relationships that are required of an effective democracy.