Detente and Deterrence: From Kissinger to Carter

摘要

The interrelationships between detente and deterrence are often confusing and misinterpreted. For one group of Americans, detente is a no-win policy. The US has acquiesced at every encounter but gained nothing in return from the USSR. As Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey once chastised Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, 'I do suggest for the most part the gains that have been made in detente have accrued largely to the Russian side, that is, on specific issues.' Others take an even harsher view and argue that the USSR has no genuine interest in detente. Detente is only a guise to weaken American resolve to resist Soviet pressures while the USSR passes the US militarily. The latter point very well could be a Soviet objective, but the more important issue is that the USSR cannot obtain it unless the US concedes and allows such an action to occur. There does not seem to be any evidence in either American declarations or actions to support the idea that during either the Kissinger years or the current administration the US was or is willing to negotiate or abdicate American strategic nuclear deterrent powers. Kissinger referred to the need to retain American power as 'essential equivalence' while the Carter Administration has chosen to use the term 'rough equivalence.' Whatever the terminology, the concept remains the same. Even in an era of improved bilateral relations--detente--the US must retain the ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviets in case the detente impulse should fade at some time in the future. This interrelationship and its continuity between Republican and Democratic administrations is the thesis of this paper.