Rapid Deployment Strategies for the Half War: Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1980

摘要

This thesis consists of a strategic, organizational and logistic analysis of the contemporary planning of conventional forces to meet a limited contingency. It is centered around this question: Why, from 1960 to 1980 did the United States fail to construct a coherent limited contingency force. An analysis of a series of strategic, organizational, and logistic case studies, utilizing a method of structured, focused comparison, revealed the following. The strategic concept of the 'half war' or limited contingency was never articulated adequately to support specific force planning. Because a range of scenarios imbedded in the 'half war' planning factor were not disaggregated from the overall strategic concept, the 'half war' served as a poor guide to conventional force planning. Organizations designed to oversee and command limited contingency forces, fragmented by interservice rivalries and the lack of joint doctrine, were deprived of multi-service composition and a unified command structure. A search for economy in limited contingency forces fostered an unrealistic assumption that these forces could be deployed rapidly and could fight effectively in any environment against any adversary. Logistical and mobility systems dedicated to these strategies and organizations were never procured in numbers adequate to support a rapid deployment capability owing to low budgetary priority and perceptions that such a capability would encourage U.S. global intervention.